Unlike national markets, which tend to be supported by domestic regulatory and political institutions, global markets are only “weakly embedded.” There is no global antitrust authority, no global lender of last resort, no global regulator, no global safety net, and, of course, no global democracy. In other words, global markets suffer from weak governance, and are therefore prone to instability, inefficiency, and weak popular legitimacy.
This imbalance between the national scope of governments and the global nature of markets forms the soft underbelly of globalization. A healthy global economic system necessitates a delicate compromise between these two.
作者提出，監管協助不是限制市場運作，而資本主義並非只有單一運作模式，不同制度設計適用於不同國家︰
First, markets and governments are complements, not substitutes. If you want more and better markets, you have to have more (and better) governance. Markets work best not where states are weakest, but where they are strong.
Second, capitalism does not come with a unique model. Economic prosperity and stability can be achieved through different combinations of institutional arrangements in labor markets, finance, corporate governance, social welfare, and other areas. Nations are likely to—and indeed are entitled to—make varying choices among these arrangements depending on their needs and values.
全球經濟則必須在下列三者中取捨，即民主、國家自決與經濟全球化無法三者兼得︰
In particular, you begin to understand what I will call the fundamental political trilemma of the world economy: we cannot simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination, and economic globalization. If we want to push globalization further, we have to give up either the nation state or democratic politics. If we want to maintain and deepen democracy, we have to choose between the nation state and international economic integration. And if we want to keep the nation state and self-determination, we have to choose between deepening democracy and deepening globalization. Our troubles have their roots in our reluctance to face up to these ineluctable choices.
作者在本書提倡的是放棄全面全球化，選擇國家自決與民主︰
So we have to make some choices. Let me be clear about mine: democracy and national determination should trump hyperglobalization. Democracies have the right to protect their social arrangements, and when this right clashes with the requirements of the global economy, it is the latter that should give way.
A thin layer of international rules that leaves substantial room for maneuver by national governments is a better globalization. It can address globalization’s ills while preserving its substantial economic benefits. We need smart globalization, not maximum globalization.
第一章中，作者藉哈德遜灣公司的冒起說明權力與市場的聯繫，任何經濟流通都需要規則，規則由誰制訂與執行均為權力問題︰
Market exchange, and especially long-distance trade, cannot exist without rules imposed from somewhere. The story of the Hudson’s Bay Company reveals the close link between power and economic exchange in its naked simplicity. I want to trade with you, so you better play by my rules! We may think of later eras of globalization as more detached from state rules and power—and hence as more “pure.” But that would be quite wrong. Power was exercised; just differently—and less obviously. Where there is globalization, there are rules. What they are, who imposes them, and how—those are the only real questions.
而任何貿易都需要有人執行各種政府功能，包括交流、運用、信用、法律與秩序。在重商主義時期，這是由國家特許給商人包攬︰
The bargain that a sovereign struck with private companies under mercantilism was essentially this: You, the company, pay for the institutional infrastructure, and in return I will allow you to make monopoly profits from the resulting trade.
到後來商人無力執行這些政府功能時，國家就開始接手︰
Ultimately, someone has to shoulder the responsibility for peace, security, and the framework of laws and regulations that makes trade possible. What distinguishes mercantilism from later versions of capitalism is that the job fell by and large on private entities. When private companies could no longer perform those tasks—either because they became too weak or competition from other nations undercut their rents—the crown had to intervene.
隨著經濟發展，這些政府功能的開支通常也會增加，以維持穩定、執行法律、保障產權、穩定宏觀經濟，令市場不會失去民眾信任，這顯示市場與政府互相補足︰
Markets are most developed and most effective in generating wealth when they are backed by solid governmental institutions. Markets and states are complements, not substitutes, as simplistic economic accounts would often have it.
This need for expansion isn’t just because governments are necessary to establish peace and security, protect property rights, enforce contracts, and manage the macroeconomy. It is also because they are needed to preserve the legitimacy of markets by protecting people from the risks and insecurities markets bring with them.
然而，這些支援市場的制度雖然減少國內交易成本，不同國家有不同制度卻會導致國際交易成本增加︰
The market-supporting institutions that do exist are local and vary across nations. As a result, international trade and finance entail inherently higher transaction costs than domestic exchanges.
Governments help reduce transaction costs within national boundaries, but they are a source of friction in trade between nations.
全球市場既沒有劃一制度，也受制於不同國家制度之間，令作者質疑完全全球化是否可能︰
Hence global markets are doubly problematic: they lack the institutional underpinnings of national markets and they fall between existing institutional boundaries. This dual curse leaves economic globalization fragile and full of transaction costs, even in the absence of direct restrictions on trade and cross-border finance. It renders the quest for a perfect globalization a fool’s errand.
第二章提及英美在十九世紀中期不同的貿易策略，說明自由貿易與否隨國家在全球經濟定位不同會有相異影響︰
The lesson is clear: depending on where a country stands in the world economy and how trade policies align with its social and political cleavages, free trade can be a progressive or a regressive force.
Thus, despite the unmistakable explosion in trade, the globalization of the nineteenth century was not based as much on free trade as it is often portrayed. Policies of empire—formal or informal—clearly promoted trade, but they were based on the naked exercise of power by the metropolitan countries and hardly represented “free trade” in the true sense of the term.
十九世紀實施金本位也促金融全球化，但金本位卻令政府失去貨幣政策自主權︰
Under gold standard rules, governments had no ability to muck around with monetary policy to alter domestic credit conditions, because domestic money supplies were solely determined by gold and capital flows across national borders. In principle, central bankers had little to do besides issuing or retiring domestic currency as the level of gold in their vaults fluctuated. The system had clear, universal, and non-discretionary rules. The financial regime minimized transaction costs across national boundaries. Financiers and investors had to contend with neither surprises nor controls at the border.
當時認為金本位是最重要的原則，政府以政策維持需求、產出與就業穩定則是不可想像的︰
The maintenance of the gold standard had absolute priority in the conduct of monetary policy both because the system came to be viewed as the foundation of monetary stability and because there were no competing objectives—such as full employment or economic growth—in the conduct of monetary policy. Ideas mattered, here as elsewhere. The notion that active monetary and fiscal policies could systematically smooth business cycles or that currency devaluation could help reduce trade imbalances—these were yet to come, or heretical at best. There was no widely believed or well-articulated conception of how governments could stabilize demand, output, or employment.
金本位最後因三項因素而難持續︰在貿易逆差時，國內工資並未如預期般自動下調以維持就業，失業率上升；工人開始有投票權，長期失業無法取得工人支持；投機者認為金本位可能動搖，並沽售國內貨幣︰假若金本位得以維持，投機者沒有損失，一旦金本位取消，手持國外貨幣也可藉國內貨幣貶值平價購買資產。作者指︰
The belief systems and habits of international cooperation that served the world well under reasonably healthy economic conditions collapsed under the joint impact of the changed economic circumstances and the increase in the number of stakeholders to which governments became responsible and accountable.
在第三章，作者指國際交易必須顧及社會整體成本，而不只是當時市場價格︰
In the economist’s jargon, the resources used in international exchanges must be valued at their true social opportunity costs rather than at prevailing market prices. These two accounting schemes coincide only when markets internalize all social costs, distributional considerations can be shunted aside, and other social and political objectives are not at stake; they don’t otherwise.
其中之一就是貿易的財富再分配作用，有部份人會因為貿易而永久受到損失︰
Here lies a common misunderstanding in the public debate on trade. Free trade advocates will often grant that some people may get hurt in the short run, but will continue to argue that in the long run everyone (or at least most people) will be better off. In fact there is nothing in economics that guarantees this, and much that suggests otherwise.
而重分配的規模遠大於貿易所得，作者其中一項估計數字是50:1︰
To drive the point home, I once quantified the ratio of redistribution-to-efficiency gains following the standard assumptions economists make when we present the case for free trade. The numbers I got were huge—so large in fact that I was compelled to redo the calculations several times to make sure I wasn’t making a mistake. For example, in an economy like the United States, where average tariffs are below 5 percent, a move to complete free trade would reshuffle more than $50 of income among different groups for each dollar of efficiency or “net” gain created! Read the last sentence again in case you went through it quickly: we are talking about $50 of redistribution for every $1 of aggregate gain. It’s as if we give $51 to Adam, only to leave David $50 poorer.
由此帶出兩項問題︰相對於重分配，這麼少的得益是否值得？貿易是否符合當地的規範與社會契約？
作者認為經濟學能為更好的全球化貢獻，前提是經濟學必須認真研究當前情況，而不是自動鼓吹自由貿易︰
It is an economics that recognizes its limitations and caveats and knows that the right message depends on the context. The fine print is what economists have to contribute. I hope the reader will agree that such an economics is possible and think better of economics (even if not of economists) by the end of this book.
第四章討論二戰後的國際經濟，提到二戰後設立國際貨幣基金、世界銀行與關稅暨貿易總協定(GATT)，作者稱之為多邊主義，意思是由國際機構而非個別國家制定國際規則︰
The most notable American contribution to the postwar international economic system was multilateralism—rule-setting through international organizations, based on the cornerstone principle of non-discrimination.
Multilateralism meant that rule enforcement and belief systems would work henceforth through international institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—rather than through naked power politics or imperial rule.
This was a very important innovation… Multilateralism gave smaller and poorer nations a voice and protected their interests in an unprecedented way.
二戰後國際貿易也在歷史高峰︰
The volume of world trade grew at an average annual rate of almost 7 percent between 1948 and 1990, considerably faster than anything experienced to date. Output also expanded at a higher rate than ever before in rich and poor nations alike—both a cause and effect of the rapid rise in trade. In terms of the breadth and depth of economic progress, the Bretton Woods regime eclipsed all previous periods, including the gold standard and era of free trade during the nineteenth century. If there ever was a golden era of globalization, this was it.
但這一次全球化浪潮的原因並非自由貿易，而是各國的經濟增長︰
Broad-based growth facilitated globalization because it helped take the sharp edge off the distributional impacts of trade. The choppiness of the waters becomes less noticeable when a rapidly rising tide of economic opportunities lifts all boats. Thus national policies promoted globalization mostly as a byproduct of widely shared economic growth along with some modest opening up. The success of the Bretton Woods era suggests that healthy national economies make for a bustling world economy, even in the presence of trade controls.
作者認為GATT較寬鬆的規則，令國家有能力按國內需要決定經濟政策，自由貿易並不是一切︰
GATT’s purpose was never to maximize free trade. It was to achieve the maximum amount of trade compatible with different nations doing their own thing. In that respect the institution proved spectacularly successful.
Under the GATT priorities rested solidly in the domestic policy agenda, and this produced both its success and its endless departures from the logic of free trade.
自1990年代起，特別是金融全球化，開始取代以往的GATT模式，全球化本身成為目標，比國內經濟政策優先。此發展的象徵是世界貿易組織(WTO)︰
Along with the onset of financial globalization around 1990, the WTO marks the pursuit of a new kind of globalization that reversed the Bretton Woods priorities: hyperglobalization. Domestic economic management was to become subservient to international trade and finance rather than the other way around. Economic globalization, the international integration of markets for goods and capital (but not labor), became an end in itself, overshadowing domestic agendas.
在更深入的全球整合中，與全球貿易不合的國內規則都要改變︰
Under shallow integration, as in Bretton Woods, the trade regime requires relatively little of domestic policy. Under deep integration, by contrast, the distinction between domestic policy and trade policy disappears; any discretionary use of domestic regulations can be construed as posing an impediment to—a transaction cost on—international trade. Global rules in effect become the domestic rules.
The reality is that we lack the domestic and global strategies needed to manage globalization’s disruptions. As a result, we run the risk that the social costs of trade will outweigh the narrow economic gains and spark an even worse globalization backlash.
第五章談及金融全球化帶來的災難，其代表是亞洲金融風暴。受影響國家在經濟基本因素上並沒有重大錯失，整場金融風暴就像是一場銀行擠兌，不過這次扮演「銀行」的是國家︰
The quick recovery of South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia after 1998 once financial conditions stabilized suggests that there was fundamentally little that was wrong with their economies. Just a few years back, in 1992,
Sweden had experienced a financial crisis of similar proportions. Yet the terms “corruption” and “cronyism” don’t quite roll off the tongue when one thinks of that country. Clearly the crises indicated something endemic to financial markets, not any egregious sins committed by the Asian governments themselves.
這場擠兌是由銀行過度借貸給各國，並在風吹草動時過度反應急速撤資引起︰
As the prominent economist Jeffrey Sachs (then at Harvard and now at Columbia) forcefully and correctly argued, against the views of the IMF and the U.S. Treasury, the crisis was a financial panic largely unrelated to economic fundamentals and internal weaknesses. Asia was going through the bust stage of a boom-and-bust cycle. Banks had overlent in the run-up to the crisis and now they were overreacting in pulling back. It wasn’t the first time financial markets misbehaved, and it certainly wouldn’t be the last.
探討亞洲金融風暴起因要由資本自由流動的發展歷史開始。在1930年代大蕭條後，人們發現固定匯率制令國家財政政策無法自主，以應對宏觀經濟不穩︰
Even in periods of relative calm, the combination of fixed exchange rates with capital mobility enslaved a country’s economic management to other countries’ monetary policies. If others had tight money and high interest rates, you had no choice but to follow suit. If you tried to reduce your interest rates, you would experience a massive outflow of private capital. If, on the other hand, you wanted tighter credit than in other countries, higher interest rates at home would trigger a massive inflow of foreign money, leaving your economy flush with credit and undoing the effects of your own policies.
至於浮動匯率，作者引述凱恩斯的論點，認為浮動匯率會在金融市場造成貨幣大幅波動，也會令國際貿易不穩︰
You could, for example, have lower interest rates than elsewhere if you were willing to allow your currency to depreciate in value… but Keynes and his contemporaries rejected this option for two reasons. First, they worried, as noted above, that financial markets would create excessively volatile currencies driven by successive bouts of euphoria and pessimism. Second, they were concerned about the effects of currency instability and uncertainty on international trade.
因此，為保障全球貿易，反而需要採取資本管制︰
Their narrative made a clear distinction between the world of employment and production and the world of finance. They considered the world of finance a casino instead of a driver of economic well-being. Trade, not short-term finance, needed promotion. Hence the paradox: reduced transaction costs in trade required higher transaction costs in international finance—in other words, capital controls. Free capital mobility was out and capital controls were in.
此外，二戰後的金融體制也設立國際貨幣基金(IMF)為國家提供短暫援助，並讓國家有空間調整貨幣匯率︰
In addition to capital controls, there were two features of the new system geared toward providing that space. The first of these was the provision of short-term financing from the IMF to help countries weather temporary shortages of foreign currency and difficulties in external payments.
Second, even though countries were expected to maintain their currencies at fixed parities, these parities could be changed in the event of “fundamental disequilibrium.” …If a country’s growth and employment prospects came into conflict with its external payments, even after resort to capital controls and IMF financing, the incompatibility would be removed by adjusting the exchange rate rather than letting the domestic economy suffer.
此二戰後的布列敦森林體制有兩項問題︰美元不再依金本位後無法充當國際貨幣，以及IMF的規模不足以應對國家危機。資本管制的方式失去吸引力，隨之而來的是經濟合作暨發展組織(OECD)，致力推動資本流動︰
By the end of the 1980s, the OECD had dropped previous distinctions between short-term capital (“hot money”) and long-term investments. It also adopted the objective of full capital mobility as part of its amended Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, effectively making removal of capital controls a condition for membership in the OECD.
面對資本自由流動，不論固定匯率還是浮動匯率，國內經濟政策都無法自主，因為國家採取與別國不同的貨幣與財政政策時，資本就會流走︰
Capital mobility… prevents nations from pursuing monetary and fiscal policies that differ from those in other economies and therefore undermines the conduct of policies appropriate to the domestic economy.
Regardless of whether trading in international financial markets leads to vast shifts in funds across nations or large movements in exchange rates, Tobin complained, they have “serious and frequently painful real internal economic consequences.”
在資本自由流動的環境中，大部份金融危機都有一種盛衰規律，首先，外國資金大量流入，國家大量借貸，此時充斥該國經濟前景多美好的故事，所以不用擔心該國債務情況；然後是一點壞消息的風聲，引起一陣「急停」(“sudden stop”)，故事變成該國不負責任大量借貸，經濟似乎面對不穩；之後外國資金迅速流出，利率急升，匯率崩潰，企業信貸不足，需求收縮，經濟衰退。這也是亞洲金融風暴受影響國家的寫照。
作者提出三點以反駁金融全球化帶來經濟增長的論點︰
First, the world economy has achieved unprecedented levels of growth since World War II. Nothing in history comes even close— not the Industrial Revolution and not the nineteenth-century era of globalization.
Second, the growth rates attained during the first quarter century following the end of World War II have yet to be matched. The world economy grew at roughly 3 percent per year on a per capita basis between 1950 and 1973, nearly triple the rate prior to the 1930s and double the rate since the late 1970s… The world economy simply has not performed as well during the era of financial globalization as it did under Bretton Woods.
And third, the growth champions of the last three decades, just as those of the immediate postwar decades, were countries such as China that played the globalization game by Bretton-Woods rules rather than deep integration rules.
第六章以伯林(Isaiah Berlin)的hedgehog與fox的比喻討論經濟學家的觀點，hedgehog是指以一種核心觀念審視世界的人，fox則是以不同角度觀察世界，認為世界不能以一種觀念通行的人︰
The distinction captures neatly the divide within economics between the hedgehogs who think freeing up markets is always the right solution (the “big idea”) and the foxes who believe the devil is in the details. Foxes believe in markets, too—they are economists, after all—but they believe real world complications require a much more cautious approach that is sensitive to context.
Hedgehog經濟學家認為自由市場一定是好事，發展中國家應該實行各種措施令市場自由才能發展經濟，作者認為，以這種改革清單評價發展中國家無助於解決問題︰
A laundry list of reforms of this kind assumes that developing countries have some magic tools at their disposal to accomplish changes that have taken today’s developed countries centuries to achieve. Even worse, as the subprime crisis has demonstrated, not even the most sophisticated regulators in the world have a good fix on how to police excessive risk taking or foster adequate levels of transparency. But no matter. We can be sure that the list of prerequisites will only grow in length. And when countries run into trouble with financial markets, there will be always something on that list which they haven’t gotten quite right and on which the crisis can be blamed. There is something self-serving in this type of advocacy; the hedgehog economist can never be wrong, no matter how badly things end up.
而fox則是看到金融市場過度全球化的影響，認為要加以管制︰
In reality, “private financial markets have become internationalized much more rapidly and completely than other economic and political institutions.” In light of this, Tobin felt compelled to propose a foxlike remedy: a tax to segment international currency markets. Such a tax on international financial transactions, even if set at a very low rate, would deter traders from engaging in excessive buying and selling of currencies and other financial assets in search of very short run profits.
作者提到近年的次按風暴︰
…lenders (and borrowers) who assumed housing prices would keep rising, a housing bubble stoked by a global saving glut and the reluctance of Alan Greenspan’s Federal Reserve to deflate it, financial institutions addicted to excessive leverage, credit rating agencies that fell asleep on the job, and of course policy makers who failed to get their act together in time as the first signs of the crisis began to appear. Without these regulatory failings, the glut in global finance would not have proved dangerous; after all, low interest rates are a good thing insofar as they enable higher investment. And without the global commingling of banks’ balance sheets, the consequences of inadequate regulation would not have been as damaging; bank failures would have remained local and their effects contained.
從次按風暴可以看到全球金融市場與管制並不完美，也不可能完美。作者認為應設立資本管制與金融交易稅，以保留國內政策處罰過度槓桿的空間︰
A fox understands that markets and regulations are both condemned to remain imperfect. The systems we devise must anticipate both sets of weaknesses. It will take lots of practice and experimentation to get the balance right. It may be hard to say, “Thanks, but no thanks,” to the siren song of financial liberalization and innovation, but in a world of imperfect regulation and divided sovereignty, that will often be the only safe option.
作者認為負責任的經濟學家不應該是hedgehog，否則會造成實際損害︰
An honest practitioner of academic economics should respond with a blank stare when asked what the implications of his work are for policy. “That depends on so many other things,” would be the appropriate answer. Frustrating perhaps for the student or the journalist, but correct nevertheless. When economists mistake academic fashions for the real thing, they do considerable damage. When the hedgehogs’ highly stylized models become the basis for one grand narrative, the world needs to run for cover.
第七章討論全球不平等問題。作者提到富國貧窮人士生活水準也比窮國富有人士好，反映全球經濟的不平等︰
That it is far better to be poor in a rich country than rich in a poor country tells us something fundamental about today’s global economy. Disparities in income (as well as health and other indicators of well-being) are much larger across nations than they are within nations. The country you are born in largely determines your life possibilities.
作者指全球貿易為全球帶來不同影響，歐洲因有良好制度及較受教育的熟練工而受惠於工業革命；美、加、澳、紐也受惠於移民及歐洲資金流入而成為工業「核心」；但環境較難移民或有天然資源利用的地方則不同，這些地方制度設計用於便宜地榨取原材料，充滿不平等，以歐洲菁英為中心，沒有保護財產權及發展市場，例子有加勒比海種植園及非洲礦產經濟。作者指，核心國家與外圍國家的差別極大︰
International trade induced industrial countries to keep investing in skills, technology, and other drivers of economic growth. It also encouraged families to have fewer, better-educated children, in light of the high returns to skills that modern manufacturing industries brought. These effects were reversed in the developing countries of the periphery. Specialization in primary commodities did not encourage skill accumulation and delayed the reduction in fertility and population growth. Birth rates remained high in the developing world well into the twentieth century, unlike the industrialized countries, which experienced sharp declines in fertility toward the end of the nineteenth century.
The countries of the periphery not only failed to industrialize, they actually lost whatever industry they had. They deindustrialized.
“There cannot be any question but that the cause of deindustrialization in the Third World lay in the massive influx of European manufactured goods, especially textiles, on the markets of these countries.”
二十世紀亞洲經濟起飛也顯示全球化需要國家與市場配合才能帶動經濟增長︰
Asia’s economic experience violates stereotypes and yet offers something for everyone… Globalization is a tremendously positive force, but only if you are able to domesticate it to work for you rather than against you.
Economic growth requires a pragmatic government willing to do whatever it takes to energize the private sector. It requires using markets and globalization strategically to diversify the domestic economy away from natural resources. The specific tools and instruments needed to achieve this can vary and will depend heavily on the context. Specific recipes for success do not travel well. It is the broad vision behind them that needs emulation.
作者指，要從全球化中得益不能只交給市場，政府需要投資、設立關卡保護本土企業並鼓勵新產業，才可使全球化為國家帶來好處︰
The benefits of globalization come to those who invest in domestic social capabilities. Those investments in turn require some degree of support for domestic firms—protective tariffs, subsidies, undervalued currencies, cheap funding, and other kinds of government assistance that increase the rewards for entering new lines of business without closing the economy to the outside world.
第八章討論1980年代開始發展經濟學轉向支持自由流動的趨勢，世界銀行是推動這趨勢的重要角色︰
By the 1980s, the dominant view among North American development experts and their followers had changed dramatically. The state went from being a handmaiden of economic growth to the principal obstacle blocking it. The international division of labor was transformed from a threat to a savior. During the 1990s, enthusiasm for free capital mobility was added to the package too, as we saw in an earlier chapter. This narrative infused development agencies such as the World Bank with a new sense of mission and reshaped the policy advice they dished out.
這趨勢統稱為「華盛頓共識」，要點是穩定化、自由化與私有化(stabilize, liberalize, and privatize)，全球化本身成為國家發展的指導因素。作者指︰
The new consensus turned foreign trade and investment into the ultimate yardsticks for judging the adequacy of domestic economic and social policies—a key deformation produced by the quest for hyperglobalization. The best argument for addressing any domestic ill… was that it forestalled integration with the world economy. Just mention “foreign investor sentiment” or “competitiveness in world markets,” and policy makers would snap to attention.
作者認為，為遷就全球化而一次推出各項改革無助改善貧窮國家，不同國家有不同的逼切需要︰
Poor countries suffer from multiple shortcomings, but not all of them need to be addressed at the same time for their economies to enjoy rapid growth for a while. The trick is to identify the most binding constraints that prevent entrepreneurs from investing in the modern industries and services that fuel economic growth.
作者也指全球化本身不能令國家更有能力，而只會擴大國家本身已有的優勢，發展中國家要先保護其本土生產能力，才能有足夠準備面對國際競爭︰
Economic growth and development are possible only through the accumulation of capabilities over time, in areas ranging from skills and technologies to public institutions. Globalization on its own does not generate these capabilities; it simply allows nations to leverage better those that they already possess. That is why the world’s successful globalizers—East Asian nations in our times—enhance their domestic productive capacities before they lay themselves bare to the gales of international competition.
第九章討論全球化與國家民主的衝突，作者指︰
National democracy and deep globalization are incompatible. Democratic politics casts a long shadow on financial markets and makes it impossible for a nation to integrate deeply with the world economy.
作者提及全球化與民主在各方面的衝突，包括勞動標準，因為僱主可以在外國僱用勞工而不需要遵守本國法規，而這些產品又會在本國銷售；資本自由流動則令各國政府為競逐資本而有減低利得稅的壓力，稅收負擔因而落在無法自由流動的勞工身上；食品安全與衛生標準難以在全球貿易下制定，並受到貿易雙方影響；雙邊投資條款與雙邊或區域貿易協定(bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and bilateral or regional trade agreements (RTAs))可能會造成雙重標準，令外國投資者擁有本國投資者沒有的權利；全面全球化令發展中國家無法訂定自己的工業政策，以扶助本土工業。
面對本國民主與全球市場衝突可以有三種回應︰限制民主、限制全球化或者令民主全球化，這就是本書一開始提到的三難，即全面全球化、民主與國家自主三者不可兼得。作者指︰
The menu captures the fundamental political trilemma of the world economy: we cannot have hyperglobalization, democracy, and national self-determination all at once. We can have at most two out of three. If we want hyperglobalization and democracy, we need to give up on the nation state. If we must keep the nation state and want hyperglobalization too, then we must forget about democracy. And if we want to combine democracy with the nation state, then it is bye-bye deep globalization. The figure below depicts these choices.
作者反對為遷就全球化及保持民族國家而放棄民主，因為國家會為少數人把持，並犧牲民眾福祉為「投資者信心」服務。作者也
支持推行全球管治，因為全球民主要在多元化社會中達致共同標準，成果有限︰
I am skeptical about the global governance option, but mostly on substantive rather than practical grounds. There is simply too much diversity in the world for nations to be shoehorned into common rules, even if these rules are somehow the product of democratic processes. Global standards and regulations are not just impractical; they are undesirable. The democratic legitimacy constraint virtually ensures that global governance will result in the lowest common denominator, a regime of weak and ineffective rules.
剩下的選擇就是放棄全面全球化︰
The only remaining option sacrifices hyperglobalization. The Bretton Woods regime did this, which is why I have called it the Bretton Woods compromise. The Bretton Woods–GATT regime allowed countries to dance to their own tune as long as they removed a number of border restrictions on trade and generally treated all their trade partners equally. They were allowed (indeed encouraged) to maintain restrictions on capital flows, as the architects of the postwar economic order did not believe that free capital flows were compatible with domestic economic stability. Developing country policies were effectively left outside the scope of international discipline.
第十章集中討論全球管治，作者指全球管治的問題是缺乏問責︰
The Achilles’ heel of global governance is lack of clear accountability relationships. In a nation state, the electorate is the ultimate source of political mandates and elections the ultimate vehicle for accountability. If you do not respond to your constituencies’ expectations and aspirations, you are voted out. Global electoral accountability of this sort is too far-fetched a notion. We would need different mechanisms.
作者以歐債危機的歐盟為例，指出全球管治的困難︰
The European Union demonstrates the difficulties of achieving a political union robust enough to underpin deep economic integration even among a comparatively small number of like-minded countries. At best, it is the exception that tests the rule. The European Union proves that transnational democratic governance is workable, but its experience also lays bare the demanding requirements of such governance. Anyone who thinks global governance is a plausible path for the world economy at large would do well to consider Europe’s experience.
當不同國家有不同標準，而產品卻在全球銷售時，可能會導致生產方式與消費國的價值衝突，例如童工。面對這種衝突時，作者指有兩種方式回應︰制訂全球標準，或者依靠市場解決。
制定全球標準的問題是，對一個國家好的限制對另一個國家未必是好事，例如貧窮國家禁止兒童工作，並不會令兒童自動受到教育，反而可能會令他們走向非法工作賺取收入。另一問題是即使有全球標準也不表示標準一定是正確的，作者舉例指巴塞爾銀行監管委員會的建議就先後助長亞洲金融風暴與金融海嘯。
至於依靠市場解決，例如以標籤方式表明產品並非童工生產，提供資訊給消費者選擇，問題是沒有人能夠監管這些發出證明的人，而這些發出證明者各有自己的動機，不一定與社會所需一致。
作者認為，不同國家可以有不同標準，但外國產品則需符合入口國標準才可入口︰
The United States should determine its own health and safety standards, and allow only toys that satisfy those standards to be imported. If other countries want to have different standards, or are unable to match U.S. standards for practical reasons, they would be similarly entitled to their own variants. But they cannot expect to export their products freely to the United States unless they meet the U.S. standards. This approach enables countries to uphold their own regulations, even if it comes at the cost of barriers at the border.
作者再次強調全面全球化無法在多元國家中實行︰
We must acknowledge and accept the restraints on globalization that a divided global polity entails. The scope of workable global regulation limits the scope of desirable globalization. Hyperglobalization cannot be achieved, and we should not pretend that it can. Ultimately, this reality check can lead us to a healthier, more sustainable world order.
第十一章討論作者稱為Capitalism 3.0的社會，即市場及其相關制度如何在全球層面取得平衡︰
We must reinvent capitalism for a new century in which the forces of economic globalization are much more powerful. Just as Smith’s lean capitalism (Capitalism 1.0) was transformed into Keynes’s mixed economy (Capitalism 2.0), we need to contemplate a transition from the national version of the mixed economy to its global counterpart. We need to imagine a better balance between markets and their supporting institutions at the global level. It is tempting to think that the solution—Capitalism 3.0—lies in a straightforward extension of the logic of Capitalism 2.0: a global economy requires global governance. But as we saw in the previous chapter, the global governance option is a dead end for the vast majority of nations… We need a different vision, one that safeguards the considerable benefits of a moderate globalization while explicitly recognizing the virtues of national diversity and the centrality of national governance. What we need, in effect, is an updating of the Bretton Woods compromise for the twenty-first century.
作者提出以下七項全球經濟管治原則︰
1. Markets must be deeply embedded in systems of governance.
市場並非獨立於社會之外，而是社會整體一部份，需要法制、稅制、社會保障等制度支持。
2. Democratic governance and political communities are organized largely within nation states, and are likely to remain so for the immediate future.
正如上一章所言，全球劃一管治並不實際，管治仍主要在民族國家範圍之內。
3. There is no “one way” to prosperity.
有效市場所需制度可以各有不同，並不限於單一形式。成功的社會會為未來留下空間讓制度試驗及演變，全球經濟也應認同制度多元而不是強行劃一。
4. Countries have the right to protect their own social arrangements, regulations, and institutions.
國家可在貿易明顯威脅國內廣受認同的政策時提高貿易門檻，各種價值衝突時則認在國內充分商議及辯論。
5. Countries do not have the right to impose their institutions on others.
國家有權採用不同制度，不能強加於人。
6. The purpose of international economic arrangements must be to lay down the traffic rules for managing the interface among national institutions.
多面向體制的目標不是令全球貨物與資本流動越多越好，而是令不同國家在其社會體制下可以追求自己的價值與發展目標。
7. Non-democratic countries cannot count on the same rights and privileges in the international economic order as democracies.
作者認為非民主國家的制度不能代表其公民的取向，故此國際社會沒有需要尊重非民主國家制度的制度安排。
作者補充︰
Democracy, after all, is a global norm. It ought to be one of the cornerstone principles of the international trade regime, trumping non-discrimination when necessary.
作者認為貿易障礙不應與如氣候變化等global common的議題類比，因為氣候變化有一個國家不合作，損失就由全球來承受；但全球貿易如果會帶來損失，只要這是該國民眾的選擇，損失由貿易障礙國承擔︰
When trade barriers serve only to transfer income from some groups to others, at the cost of shrinking the overall economic pie, domestic rather than foreign groups bear the bulk of these costs. In the global economy, countries pursue “good” policies because it is in their interest to do so. Openness relies on self-interest, not because it helps others.
不過看到這段又想到，這樣說的話至少該貿易伙伴也要承擔損失，而貿易伙伴國並沒有權力改變該國做法。
第十二章是最後一章，討論怎樣的全球化才算明智，討論範圍有四方面︰國際貿易體制、全球金融、全球勞工流動與中國在世界經濟。
在國際貿易體制方面，作者認為國與國之間應討論如何增加本國在保障社會政策與規則的空間，並有「退出」(“opt-outs”)條款保障國家在有需要時豁免WTO的限制。要行使這種保障，國家需顯示其跟隨公開程序與遵從特定步驟，以保證該決定符合民主。以這種保障取消某種貿易協定，作者認為出口商也不應追討損失，因為條款訂立時的環境已改變。至於基本勞工權利如禁止歧視、集會自由、集體談判權及禁止強制勞動等則應受到保障，假如有國家違反，入口國則有權以退出條款中止與違反的出口國貿易。
在全球金融方面，作者認為全球金融規則在各國環境不同下無法劃一，若強行劃一也只會達成有限共識。金融規則應與產品標準類似，尊重各國差異，但參與一國市場時，不論是否外國投資者，都要遵守該國的金融規則。然而，金融全球化卻令各國規則各異難以實行，因為資本會流向管制較少的國家。故此作者提出金融規則多元化需與限制全球金融配合，跨國金融需受到限制，政府應有能力阻止銀行資產流出，以防止國內規則變成一紙空文。減少國際規則劃一也可令技術官僚的影響降低，由國內民主國會負責制訂規則；對發展中國家來說，金融規則多元化也令國家有能力管理國際資金流動，防止匯率急劇變動。
作者指國際勞工市場應更為開放，以令發展中國家勞工有機會賺取更高工資、吸收經驗、學習技能、建立人脈、累積投資資本。作者提議富裕國家可發放臨時工作簽證給貧窮國家，數量為國家勞工總數3%，包括技術及非技術勞工，並而按金及入境配額等措施令入境勞工按時回國。基於計劃只佔勞工總數3%，作者認為即使會對富裕國家的就業帶來影響，也相當有限，估計不多於1%。
至於中國，自從加入WTO後，中國不再以關稅限制入口，取而代之的是貨幣匯率低於實際值，令貿易順差大為提升︰
But the Chinese government wasn’t about to give up on its growth strategy. To compensate for the decline in protection and direct support to manufacturing, it allowed the renminbi to become increasingly undervalued. A cheap domestic currency has the same economic effects as a subsidy on exports combined with a tax on imports. Unlike conventional industrial policy, it necessarily generates a trade surplus. So China’s membership in the WTO in December 2001 produced an unwelcome side effect: a precipitous rise in its trade surplus followed at just around the same time.
正如前述，作者認為應放寬WTO對發展中國家的限制︰
The right approach would be to leave China, and indeed all emerging nations, free to pursue their own growth policies. WTO restrictions on subsidies and other industrial policies should be suspended or subsumed under a general exception for developing nations…The quid pro quo would be this: you are entitled to your own growth strategy, but you also need to ensure that you do not produce large negative effects for the rest of the world in the form of trade surpluses.
作者也一而貫之認為中國若要出口他國就要遵守入口國的規則，而中國的非民主政體亦令其貿易需受國際更多審視︰
If China and other developing nations want their policy space, they will have to allow rich nations to have theirs as well. China has every right to maintain its distinctive institutions; but it cannot expect other nations to alter their own economic and social models under threat from Chinese competition. Furthermore, China’s nondemocratic political regime requires that its trade receive much greater scrutiny than the trade of other countries like Brazil, Turkey, or India.
作者總結全書指︰
We can and should tell a different story about globalization. Instead of viewing it as a system that requires a single set of institutions or one principal economic superpower, we should accept it as a collection of diverse nations whose interactions are regulated by a thin layer of simple, transparent, and commonsense traffic rules. This vision will not construct a path toward a “flat” world—a borderless world economy. Nothing will. What it will do is enable a healthy, sustainable world economy that leaves room for democracies to determine their own futures.
本書附錄是一則寓言，內容與本書論點相關，已上載於作者網誌，如果覺得上面內容太長氣，看這個附錄也好。
